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JURISDICTION OVER OUT-OF-STATE VENDORS
OPERATING THROUGH SOLICITORS*
By Louis F. DEL DUCASALES AND USE TAx

N RECENT years Sales and Use Tax administrators have been carefully scrutinizing the activities of out-of-state vendors. In turn, out-of-state vendors
have assiduously organized their sales operations so as to minimize contacts
with taxing jurisdictions and thereby avoid tax liability. This conflict has produced a substantial volume of legislative and regulatory activity. In addition,
extensive litigation has sometimes confused rather than clarified the law.
An initial inquiry relevant to the determination of the sales or use tax
liability of an out-of-state vendor is whether or not the particular state statute is
drafted so as to subject the vendor to tax liability. Pennsylvania's experience in
this area is typical and will provide a basis for a general discussion of this question.'
The Selective Sales and Use Tax Act of March 6, 1956,2 as amended,' is
presently in effect in Pennsylvania. Sections 201 and 546 of said act require
vendors "maintaining a place of business" in Pennsylvania to collect and remit
tax to the Commonwealth. Section 2 (b) of the act defines "maintaining a place
of business." '
* Parts of this article were presented as a paper at the twenty-seventh annual meeting of the
National Association of Tax Administrators in Buffalo. New York. July 8-11, 1959.
t B.A., Temple University; LL.B., Harvard University; LL.D., University of Rome; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
I The Pennsylvania Selective Sales and Use Tax Act is unique in that, unlike sales and use
tax statutes of other jurisdictions, it does not provide a general definition of "tangible personal
property," "corporeal property" or some other analogous term describing the type of property, the
sale or purchase of which is taxable. Only a "sale at retail" or "purchase at retail" of tangible per•sonal property, which falls within one of the eighteen categories included within the definition of
"tangible personal property" set forth in section 2(1), is subject to tax.
2Act of 1956, March 6, P.L. (1955)
1228.
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-1 (1959).
4
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2 (b) (1959).
This section provides: "...
(b) 'Maintaining a place of business in this Commonwealth':
1. Having or Maintaining within this Commonwealth, directly or by a subsidiary, an
office, distribution house, sales house, warehouse, service enterprise or other place of business,
or any agent of general or restricted authority, irrespective of whether the place of business or
agent is located here permanently or temporarily, or whether the person or subsidiary maintaining such place of business or agent is authorized to do business within this Commonwealth;
or
2. The engaging in any activity as a business within this Commonwealth by any person
directly or by a subsidiary in connection with the lease, sale or delivery of tangible personal
property, or the performance of services thereon, for use, storage or consumption, including, but
not limited to having, maintaining or using any office, distribution house, sales house, warehouse or other place of business, any stock of goods, or any solicitor, salesman, agent or repre[7]
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What types of activities fall within this definition? Cases in which the
out-of-state vendor maintains ". . . an office, distribution house, sales house,
warehouse or other place of business . . ." have not proved to be a source of substantial difficulty. In such cases the vendor has usually decided that the economic
benefits to be derived from full scale operation in the taxing jurisdiction off-set
the disadvantage of incurring tax liability.
Use of so called "manufacturer's representatives," "secretaries," "solicitors," etc., by the out-of-state vendor raises some difficulties. In this type of
operation orders generally must be approved by the out-of-state vendor's home
office, and shipment of the merchandise is generally from the out-of-state office,
f.o.b. some point outside of the taxing jurisdiction. In dealing with this type of
situation it should be noted that included within the definition of "maintaining
a place of business" is "having or maintaining within this Commonwealth . . .
any agent of general or restricted authority . . ." and "the engaging in any
activity as a business within this Commonwealth . . . in connection with the
lease, sale or delivery of tangible personal property... for use, storage or consumption, including, but not limited to having, maintaining, or using ... any
solicitor, salesman, agent or representative under its authority, at its direction
or with its permission.... " The use of such language evidences a legislative
intention to provide a broad base for imposing tax on out-of-state vendors operating through solicitors. The out-of-state vendor will invariably defend against
the imposition of tax on the theory that he is operating within the taxing jurisdiction only through "independent contractors."
A variety of factors may be relevant in deciding whether or not the out-ofstate vendor actually has an "agent of general or restricted authority," or is
"maintaining or using . . . any solicitor, salesman, agent or representative"
within the taxing jurisdiction. Payment of commissions or salary in cash, premiums, or any other form is a very persuasive finding relevant to the existence of
any one of the relationships set forth in the statute. The distinction between an
employe authorized to make binding contracts and one whose only authority is
to forward orders to an out-of-state home office is of no consequence under this
statute because "agents of general or restricted authority" or "any solicitor, salesman, agent or representative" are included within the definition of "maintaining
a place of business" in the Commonwealth. Additional factors which may be
sentative, under its authority, at its direction or with its permission, regardless of whether the
person or subsidiary is authorized to do business in this Commonwealth." (Emphasis added.)
A proposed amendment to this section is presently before the legislature (Pa. H. R. No. 2100).
This section would add a third subsection as follows:
"(3) Regularly or substantially soliciting orders within this Commonwealth in connection with
the lease sale or delivery of tangible personal property to or the performance thereon of services
for residents of this Commonwealth by means of catalogues or other advertising whether such
orders are accepted within or without this Commonwealth."
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relevant in establishing the relationships set forth in the statute include attendance at sales meetings set up by the out-of-state vendor, use of order forms
and/or catalogues supplied by the out-of-state vendor, receipt of instructions
from the out-of-state vendor, sale of merchandise at prices fixed by the out-ofstate vendor, extension of credit to the purchaser by the out-of-state vendor, and
processing of complaints against the out-of-state vendor regarding defects in
merchandise.
The legislative definitions of "maintaining a place of business in this Commonwealth" contained in the act are expressly made applicable, irrespective of
whether or not the person or subsidiary maintaining such place of business is
authorized to "do 'business" in the Commonwealth.' The Legislature has thereby
unequivocally evidenced its intention to define "maintaining a place of business
in this Commonwealth" so as to encompass more situations than those wherein
the vendor is technically "authorized to do business" or "doing business" within
the State.' Of course, a vendor who is actually "authorized to do business" or
who is "doing business" in Pennsylvania is also "maintaining a place of business"
in this Commonwealth under the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act.
A second inquiry relevant to the determination of the sales or use tax
liability of an out-of-state vendor pertains to the extent of the constitutional
limitations imposed on the taxing power of state and local governments by the
commerce clause of the federal constitution. This clause reads as follows:
"Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states.
In early Supreme Court decisions this section was used as the basis for
categorically prohibiting the states from imposing a tax not only on goods in
transit to other states, but also on goods which had reached the state of destination and remained in the "original package." ' 8 This approach, however, was

5

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(i) (1959). This distinction between "doing business" and
"maintaining a place of business" for purposes of the Pennsylvania Selective Sales and Use Tax
Act is also expressly recognized by the Legislature in the definition of "resident" in section 2(i).
6 There is some uncertainty in the law regarding amenability to "service of process" as to
whether or not an out-of-state vendor's agent operating within the Commonwealth must be authorized to accept, as well as solicit, contracts in order to establish that the out-of-state vendor is "doing
business" within the Commonwealth. Shambe v. Delaware and Hudson R. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240, 135
Atd. 755 (1927); Lutz v. Foster and Kester Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 125, 72 A.2d 222 (1951); Moutchand
Merriwether Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh School Dist., 381 Pa. 619, 116 A.2d 733 (1955); Raimey v.
Donora Southern R. R. Co., 37 Pa. Wash. Co. Rep. 70 (1956); Jenkins v. Delaware Publishing
Co., 132 F. Supp. 556 (1955).
7 U. S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.

8 This is illustrated in the court's early treatment of the "original package" cases. This doctrine
originated in Brown v. Maryland, 7 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), where a discriminatory tax on
imports was involved. The doctrine was considered for a time to be an absolute limitation on the
exercise of state taxing power over interstate commerce. It was held inapplicable when the Supreme
Court ruled it would be unjust to permit a merchant engaged in interstate commerce to avoid payment of a non-discriminatory tax which the State had levied on the sale of goods in their original
package after they had reached the state of destination. See Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.)
123 (1869); Hinson v. Lott, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1869).
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rejected in subsequent cases. For example, in American Steel and Wire Co. v.
Speed,9 Justice White noted that the question raised where states were attempting to tax commerce between the states was not whether interstate commerce
had completely terminated, but whether a particular exercise of state taxing
power "so operated upon interstate commerce as to amount to a regulation thereof, in conflict with the paramount authority conferred upon Congress."'" Justice
White pointed out that the Court, in so holding, had
: * . conceded that the goods taxed had not completely lost their character as

interstate commerce since they had . . . been sold in the original packages.
However, as they had arrived at their destination, were at rest in the state, were
enjoying the protection which the laws of the state afforded, and were taxed
without discrimination, it was held that the tax was not a regulation in the sense
of the Constitution, although its levy might remotely and indirectly affect interstate commerce."
The Supreme Court has continued to use the general criteria established
in the American Steel and Wire case in numerous cases involving state and local
power to tax interstate commerce. 2
In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.," New York City
levied a sa'les tax on sales of coal by a Pennsylvania corporation to customers in
New York City. The contracts were made in New York but -required shipment
and delivery direct from mines in Pennsylvania. The tax was levied on receipts
from all sales consummated in New York City. "Sale" was defined by the act
as "any transfer of title or possession or both . . . in any manner or by any
means whatsoever for a consideration or any agreement therefor." '" The vendor was authorized to collect the tax from the purchaser and was liable for payment of the tax to the city, regardless of whether or not the tax was collected
from the purchasers. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, reasoned that interstate commerce should, pay its fair share of the tax, that the tax in question was
not discriminatory against interstate commerce and that it was imposed on a
9 192 U. S. 500 (1903).

10 Id. at 521.
11Justice Cardozo elaborated on this statement in Baldwin v. Sellig, 294 U. S. 511, 526, (1934),
as follows:
"The test of the 'original package' which came into our law with Brown v. Maryland,
is not inflexible and final for the transactions of interstate commerce, whatever may be its
validity for commerce with other countries. . . . There are purposes for which merchandise,
transported from another state, will be treated as a part of the general mass of property at
the state of destination though still in the original containers. This is so, for illustration, where
merchandise so contained is subject to a non-discriminatory property tax which it bears equally
with other merchandise produced within the state .... "
12 Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466 (1922); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940); McGoldrick v. Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U. S. 70 (1940); McGoldrick v. DuGrenier, 309 U. S. 70 (1940).
13 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
14 Id. at 43.
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"local activity" distinct from interstate commerce. Concerning the incidence of
the tax and its relationship to interstate commerce Justice Stone stated:
Its only relation to the commerce arises from the fact that immediately
preceding transfer of possession to the purchaser within the state, which is the
taxable event regardless of the time and place of passing title, the merchandise

has been transported in interstate commerce and brought to its journey's end. 15
(Emphasis added.)
Commenting on the economic effect of the tax, Justice Stone concluded
that it had
no different effect upon interstate commerce than a tax on the "use" of property which has just been moved in interstate commerce . .. or the tax on
storage or withdrawal for use by the consignee of gasoline . . . or the

familiar property tax on goods by the state of destination at the conclusion of
their interstate journey.16
Justice Stone distinguished Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, "7in which the state

of origin imposed a tax on total gross receipts from interstate commerce, by
pointing out that such a tax was placed on proceeds derived from extra-state
activity in interstate commerce rather than on receipts from wholly local activities. The transfer of possession to the purchaser which occurred at the end of
interstate transportation in the Berwind-White case was ruled to be a wholly
local activity which had not been taxed elsewhere and which was separate and
distinct from the commerce itself.
In McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co.,18 the above-mentioned New

York City sales tax was imposed on an Illinois corporation with its factory and
principal place of business in Illinois. The taxpayer was engaged in manufacturing and selling adding and calculating machines. It maintained an office in
New York City for its agents who solicited orders in that city. These orders
were forwarded to the home office in Illinois for approval. If accepted, the
order was filled by allocating to it the machine designated by serial number on
the purchase order. It was then invoiced to the purchaser and shipped to New
York City to the taxpayer's selling agent where it was inspected, tested, adjusted
and then delivered to the purchaser. Remittances were made by the purchaser
directly to the Illinois office. The companion case of McGoldrick v. DuGrenier "
involved the same New York City sales tax, which was imposed on a Massachusetts corporation with its factory and principal place of business in Massachusetts. The taxpayer was engaged in the manufacturing and selling of autoId. at 49.
18 Ibid.
17 304 U. S. 307 (1938).

15

18 309 U. S. 70 (1940).

19 Ibid.
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matic vending machines. Some sales of machines were made directly from the
New York office, while others were effected through solicitation of orders by
agents. In the latter situations, the agents took from prospective purchasers
signed orders or contracts for conditional sales and partial payments which they
forwarded to the Massachusetts office for approval. If accepted, the order was
filled by shipping the machine by rail or truck directly to the purchaser in
New York City. The purchaser paid the freight. In both the Felt & Tarrant
case and the DuGreniercase the sales tax assessment was sustained. In both
cases orders were taken in the taxing jurisdiction, sent to the out-of-state home
office for approval and acceptance, and possession was transferred to the purchaser in the taxing jurisdiction. In the DuGreniercase the goods were shipped
f.o.b. Massachusetts, the place of shipment, to New York City. On the basis
of its conclusion that the transfer of the goods from the carrier to the buyer
within the taxing jurisdiction was a "transfer of possession" sufficient to constitute a taxable event, regardless of the f.o.b. terms of the contract, the Court
ruled that the Berwind-White decision governed the transaction.
The case of InternationalHarvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury ° involved a
tax on gross receipts, which was imposed on receipts from sales followed by
shipment in interstate commerce as well as receipts from sales at the end of an
interstate transfer. The court relied on the Berwind-White case as authority
for sustaining the tax in both of these situations. It also cited with approval its
earlier decision in the case of Dep't of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp. 1
In that case, the taxpayer, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Pennsylvania, obtained merchandise from a producer in Indiana.
Taxpayer simultaneously accepted the merchandise from the producer in Indiana
and sold it to a buyer, if said buyer's inspection established that the merchandise
was acceptable. The buyer then immediately loaded the merchandise on
freight cars and shipped it out-of-state. Payment for the merchandise was made
to the taxpayer in Pennsylvania. The Indiana tax on the receipts obtained by
the taxpayer from these sales was sustained. 2
In the case of McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.,"3 the foreign corporation was
not qualified to do business and had no sales office, branch plant, or any other
place of business in Arkansas, the taxing jurisdiction. The Court held that the
corporation was not liable under the Arkansas Sales Tax Statute where its only
U.S. 340 (1944).
U.S. 62 (1941).
22 The Court distinguished its decision in the case of Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307,
(1938), which involved the same Indiana statute, on the grounds that the Wood case raised the
question of the validity of the tax upon receipts derived from sources within the State while the
Adams case raised the question of the validity of the tax upon receipts from sales to customers in
other states and abroad.
20322
21313

23 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
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contact with that state was through traveling salesmen, domiciled in Tennessee,
who merely solicited sales in Arkansas and had no authority to enter into binding
contracts but were merely empowered to accept orders and send them back to
their Tennessee home office for approval and final acceptance. The Court also
pointed out that passage of title of the goods sold occurred in all cases in Tennessee. However, the Court did not expressly overrule the "transfer of possession" doctrine which it had developed in the Berwind-White case. It distinguished the Berwind-White case on the grounds that the vendor in the McLeod
case did not maintain any sales offices in the taxing state of Arkansas. It should
be noted that the InternationalHarvester Co. case, discussed in the preceding
paragraph, was decided by the Court on the same day as the McLeod case and
that in the former case the Court applied the "transfer of possession" doctrine
which it had developed in the Berwind-White, Felt-Tarrant,and DuGrenier
cases.
Noting that Arkansas had chosen to enact only a sales tax and no complimentary use tax the Court concluded in the McLeod case that no authority
existed for ". . . rejecting the deliberate choice of a State to impose a tax on a
transfer of ownership and sustaining it, where the transfer was made beyond the
state limits, as a use tax on that property because the state might, so far as the
federal constitution is concerned, have enacted a use tax and such a use tax
might have been collected on the enjoyment of the goods sold." 24
In Norton Co. v. Illinois25 the Court considered the constitutionality of an
Illinois Occupation Tax imposed "upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this State." 26 Illinois imposed this tax
on the taxpayer based on gross receipts from all sales to Illinois customers.
Norton Co., a Massachusetts corporation, operated a branch office and warehouse
in Chicago which, in addition to over-the-counter sales, received orders that
were forwarded to the (home office for acceptance, acted as intermediary in distributing products from the home office in carload lots so as to reduce freight
charges, serviced machines after sale and stood ready to receive complaints and
to give engineering and technical advice. The corporation also received at its
home office directly from Illinois customers orders which were filled by shipment directly to these customers. Norton Co. conceded its liability as to the
Chicago over-the-counter sales. The Supreme Court in sustaining the tax as to
sales of goods shipped from the Massachusetts home office to the Chicago office
24 Id. at 331. On the same day the Court decided the McLeod case it also decided General
Trading Company v. Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944), which required an out-of-state vendor to act as
a collecting agent of a use tax imposed by the taxing state. The General Trading case is more fully
discussed at a later point in this article.
25 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
28 ILL. REv. STAT., 1949, c. 120 § 441.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64

and then distributed to Illinois customers, and also as to sales on orders forwarded by the Chicago office but shipped directly to the customer from the
Massachusetts home office, said, "Petitioner has not established that such services
as were rendered by the Chicago office were not decisive factors in establishing
and holding this market." 7 Sales to customers sending orders directly to the
home office which were filled by shipments directly to the customers were held
to be within the protection of the commerce clause. Justices Clark, Black, and
Douglas agreed with the majority to the extent that the tax was sustained and
dissented on the last point on the ground that the presence of the branch office in
the state could reasonably be regarded as a factor in obtaining the orders sent by
customers directly to the home office and filled -by shipments from there to the
customers. 8 Citing the McLeod v. Dilworth Co. case as authority, the majority
opinion by way of dicta said:
Where a corporation chooses to stay at home in all respects except to send
abroad advertising or drummers to solicit orders which are sent directly to the
home office for acceptance, filling, and delivery back to the buyer, it is obvious
that the State of the buyer has no local grip on the seller. Unless some local
incident occurs sufficient to bring the transaction within its taxing power, the
vendor is not taxable.29
However, the court once again reaffirmed the above-mentioned reservation it
had expressed in McLeod v. Dilworth, by stating:
Of course, a state imposing a sales or use tax can more easily meet this
burden, because the impact of those taxes is on the local buyer or user. Cases
involving them are not controlling here, for this tax falls on the vendor.38
The above cases indicate that the Supreme Court in deciding whether or not
a sales, gross receipts, or occupation tax places an undue burden on interstate
commerce has inquired into the incidents of the transactions which occur within
the taxing state and the extent to which interstate commerce is affected by the
tax. In so doing, it has considered relevant the fact that the vendor maintained
business offices and/or solicitors in the taxing jurisdiction. The fact that solicitors only had authority to obtain orders and did not have authority to conclude
final contracts has not deterred the Court from validating the state tax where
27 Norton Co. v. Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 538 (1951).

28 The Court has subsequently affirmed a decision of the Supreme Court of Washington holding that the Washington Occupation Tax applied to all interstate sales channeled through the local
office of a foreign corporation where said local office rendered services which were decisive factors
in establishing and holding the local market for the corporation's products. Sales made by the corporation through salesmen reporting to the local office were held taxable even though orders were forwarded to and accepted by the corporation's out-of-state home office and merchandise was shipped
from out-of-state directly to the customer. Field Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington, 352 U.S. 806

(1956).
29 Norton Co. v. Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 537 (1951).

so Ibid.
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it found that the out-of-state vendor had additional contacts with the taxing
state. Transfer of title or possession within the territorial limits of the taxing
state has also persuaded the Court to validate the state tax. The Court has held
that the requirements of "transfer of possession" are met if possession is transferred from the carrier to the buyer within the taxing jurisdiction, regardless of
whether f.o.b. terms of the contract of -sale are f.o.b. state of origin or f.o.b. state
of destination. The Court has also indicated that the extent of the vendor's
operations in the taxing jurisdiction is relevant in deciding whether the state
tax violates the commerce clause. Finally, the Court has carefully scrutinized
the taxing statute for possible discrimination against interstate commerce. As
indicated by the previous cases, the Court has sustained state taxes under various
combinations of the above factors, depending on the degree of relationship between the sale and the taxing state and the extent to which interstate commerce
is affected.

States imposing a sales tax generally have enacted compensatory use taxes.
The Pennsylvania Selective Sales and Use Tax Act imposes a compensatory
tax on the use of tangible personal property in Pennsylvania where no tax is
paid or payable upon the sale of such property. 1 The act requires vendors
"maintaining a place of business" within the Commonwealth to collect such use
tax for the Commonwealth. 2 Is the application of such statutory provisions to
out-of-state vendors operating in the taxing jurisdiction through solicitors in
accord with the commerce clause?
In Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson3 Iowa imposed a tax on the use of
gasoline. The out-of-state seller was doing business in Iowa. Justice Roberts,
in sustaining the tax on the vendor's shipments from Oklahoma directly to
purchasers in Iowa for use in Iowa, said:
The statute obviously was not intended to reach transactions in interstate
commerce, but to tax the use of motor fuel after it had come to rest in Iowa,
and the requirement that the appellant as the shipper into Iowa shall, as agent
of the State, report and pay the tax on gasoline thus coming into the state for
use by others on whom the tax falls imposes no unconstitutional burden either
upon interstate commerce or upon the appellant (out-of-state vendor).34
31

PA. STAT. ANN.

32 PA.

tit. 72 § 3403-2(o), § 3403-546(b), and § 3403-581(b) (1956).

STAT. ANN. tit. 72

33 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
3Id.

at 95.

§

3403-546 (1955).
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Subsequent to the Monamotor case, the Supreme Court considerably expanded the extent to which the out-of-state vendor can be required to collect a
use tax. In Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher" the Illinois vendor had
not qualified to conduct intrastate business in California. He merely had solicitors (whose authority was limited to soliciting orders and who were not authorized to make binding contracts on behalf of the out-of-state vendor) and two
sales offices in California. The Illinois vendor was required to collect a use
tax on his shipments from Illinois directly to the purchasers in California for
use in California.
In Nelson v. Montgomery Ward" and Nelson v. Sears
Roebuck37 the vendors did business within the taxing jurisdiction through retail stores, agents and
offices. The vendors also solicited mail order business from outside the taxing
state. They were required to collect the use tax imposed on purchases solicited
through mail order catalogues even though the mail order business was carried
on independently of the local 'business.
The Supreme Court in General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n" sustained the
constitutionality of an Iowa statute requiring out-of-state sellers to collect use
tax where the only contact with the taxing state was the activity of traveling
salesmen, based in Minnesota, who systematically solicited business in Iowa.
These salesmen were authorized only to solicit orders. Final approval and acceptance of the orders was rendered by the vendor's home office in Minnesota.
The contracts were, therefore, formally entered into outside of the taxing state.
The out-of-state seller had never qualified to do business in the taxing state and
had no office, branch, warehouse or general agents in the taxing state. The Supreme Court nevertheless sustained the enforced collection of the tax by the
out-of-state seller, citing Monamotor and Feltand TarrantMfg. Co. v. Gallagher
as authority.
In the case of Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland" the taxpayer, a Delaware corporation, refused to collect use taxes imposed by a Maryland statute which required foreign corporations to act as its collecting agents for out-of-state sales.
The Delaware corporation did not send any solicitors into Maryland, nor was it
qualified to do business there. Contact was through advertising circulars mailed
to certain Maryland customers. Infrequently, a delivery or two was made in the
taxing state. The Court ruled against Maryland and distinguished the General
Trading case on the grounds that the defendant in the Miller case engaged in
only "the occasional delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solici35 306 U.S. 62 (1939).

36 312 U.S. 373 (1941).

3r312 U.S. 359 (1941).
38 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
39 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
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tation other than the incidental effects of general advertising." 40 Therefore,
Maryland did not have an adequate "nexus" with the foreign corporation to
force it to act as its collection agent for use taxes.
This line of Supreme Court cases, and in particular the General Trading
case, establishes the right of a state to require an out-of-state vendor to serve as a
collector of use tax where the vendor's only contact with the taxing state is
through traveling salesmen whose authority is limited to merely soliciting orders.
The presence of the salesmen and use by the purchaser of the merchandise in the
taxing jurisdiction provides the required "nexus" between the taxing state and
the out-of-state vendor's selling activities.
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the commerce clause presents a more serious obstacle in the enforcement of a sales tax than a use tix.
In the Berwind-White, McGoldrick v. Felt-Tarrant, and DuGrenier cases, the
Supreme Court held the "transfer of possession" to the purchaser within the taxing state to be the taxable event which would sustain a sales tax. The validity
of this test was weakened by the "passage of title" test which the Supreme Court
enunciated four years later in the McLeod case. However, in the McLeod case
the Court did not expressly overrule the "transfer of possession" test which it
had previously developed. Instead, it distinguished the Berwind-White case on
the grounds that the vendor in the McLeod case did not maintain any sales offices
in the taxing state of Arkansas. Furthermore, on the very same day that the
McLeod case was decided the court handed down a decision in the previously
discussed InternationalHarvester Co. case, which applied the "transfer of possession" test.
The above cases indicate that states probably will experience difficulty in
imposing sales tax on out-of-state vendors operating through solicitors. However, employment of the theory that the out-of-state vendor may be required to
serve as a collector of use tax where said vendor's only contact with the taxing
state is through traveling salesmen whose authority is limited to merely soliciting orders has been repeatedly approved by the Supreme Court." In the McLeod
case, the Supreme Court expressly noted that if Arkansas had enacted a compensatory use tax and imposed a use tax on the vendor, the assessment would have
been sustained.42 In the Norton case 4 the court again expressly reaffirmed the
right of a state to require an out-of-state vendor to collect use tax by stating:
Of course, a state imposing a sales or use tax can more easily meet this
burden, [i. e. establishing some local incident which is sufficient to bring the
40 Id. at 347.
4'General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). As previously indicated in this
article the Court itself distinguished the Miller case by noting that in said case the vendor engaged
in only "the occasional delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than
the incidental effects of general advertising." 347 U.S. 340, 347 (1954).
42 322 U.S. 331 (1944).
4 Supra, note 25.
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transactions within its taxing power] because the impact of those taxes is on the
local buyer or user. Cases involving them are not controlling here for this tax
falls on the vendor. 44
NET INCOME TAX

In February 1959 the United States Supreme Court decided two state corporate tax cases which caused much concern in the business community."5 It was
feared that these opinions might be interpreted to mean that mere solicitation by
traveling salesmen, who were not authorized to make binding contracts, was a
sufficient "nexus" with a taxing jurisdiction to enable it to impose net income
tax liability as well as sales and use tax liability on out-of-state vendors. In these
cases the Court held that a state may levy a properly apportioned net income
tax upon a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, provided there are local activities forming a sufficient "nexus" with the taxing state
and providing the tax is not discriminatory against interstate commerce.
What did the Court consider a sufficient "nexus"? In Northwestern States
PortlandCement Co. v. Minnesota'"the foreign corporation was incorporated in
Iowa and engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement at its plant in Iowa.
The corporation's activities in Minnesota, the taxing state, consisted of a regular, systematic course of solicitation of orders by salesmen. Each order was subject to acceptance, filling and delivery from its plant in Iowa. Forty-eight per
cent (48o) of the corporation's entire sales were made to Minnesota purchasers. To facilitate its Minnesota operations, the corporation maintained a
secretary and four salesmen in that state as well as sales office equipped with its
own furniture and fixtures. It also furnished two cars to the salesmen. Orders
received by the salesmen and the Minnesota office were transmitted to the
corporation's Iowa office, approved there, and then acknowledged to the purchaser with copies to the salesmen. The salesmen also received and transmitted
claims against the corporation for loss or damage in any shipments made by it,
informed the company of the nature thereof and requested instructions concerning the same.
In Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Inc."7 the corporation was incorporated in Delaware and maintained its principal office and plant in Birmingham, Alabama. The only contact that the corporation had with the taxing juris44 340 U.S. 534, 537 (1951).

It should be noted that in the previously discussed Montgomery

Ward and Sears Roebuck cases where the vendors did business within the taxing jurisdiction through

retail stores, agents and offices therein, the Supreme Court sustained the imposition of a use tax
on mail order business solicited from outside the taxing state even though the mail order business
was carried on independently of the local business.
45 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959);
Williams
v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1950).
46 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
47358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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diction of Georgia was the maintenance of a sales-service office in Atlanta, which
office was staffed by one salesman and one secretary. The salesman regularly
solicited and forwarded orders to the Birmingham office, promoted business
interests and developed goodwill in Georgia for the corporation. Orders were
taken by the salesman and the Atlanta office, subject to the approval of the
Birmingham office, and shipments were made from Birmingham direct to the
customer, f.o.b. Birmingham.
Neither the Northwestern case nor the Stockham Valves case involved
mere solicitation by traveling salesmen. In both cases the corporation also maintained sales offices in the taxing jurisdiction. On May 4, 1959, in International
Shoe Co. v. Fontenot"' the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in a
case in which Louisiana had imposed a corporate net income tax on a corporation
whose contact with Louisiana was almost exclusively through solicitors merely
authorized to solicit orders. However, even in this case the activities of the outof-state vendor in the taxing state consisted of more than mere solicitdtion by
traveling salesmen, since the salesmen also displayed samples in Louisiana by
making use of hotel rooms or rooms in public buildings which had sample rooms
available for salesmen. The expense of such display rooms was paid by the
out-of-state vendor. Complaints by customers and delinquent accounts were
handled solely at the vendor's main office outside of Louisiana.
The United States Supreme Court has also sustained the imposition of a
corporate net income tax on a foreign motor carrier engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce where there were no offices in the state, except those incidental to the carrier's motor freight terminals. 4 In this instance the Court
cited only the Northwestern-Stockham case as its authority for affirming the
imposition of the tax.
These Supreme Court decisions produced a strong, concerted effort on the
part of the business community to obtain clarification and relief. In extensive
hearings before Congressional Committees" it was argued that the decisions did
not delineate the line of demarcation between activities in a state which would
subject an out-of-state vendor to net income tax liability and activities in a state
which would not subject the out-of-state vendor to net income tax liability.
Caught in such a "no man's land" and faced with the possibility of tax assess48 236 La. 279, 107 So.2d 640, cert. den'd U.S. , 79 S. Ct. 943 (1959).
See also
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So.2d 70, cert. den'd
U.S. -,
79 S. Ct. 602 (1959).
49 ET & WNC Transportation Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403, aff'dU.S. -,

79 S.Ct. 874

(1959).

50 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Small Business of United States Senate, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959); Hearings Before the Committee on Finance of United States Senate, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959); S. REP. No. 453, 86th Cong., 1st Session (1959); Senate Finance Committee
Report, 20 CCH'STATE TAX REV. No. 33.
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ments of considerable size several years after the books for a given year had
been closed, the out-of-state vendors pointed out that such circumstances were
unhealthy, not only for out-of-state vendors, but also for the general economic
well-being of the country, since lack of predictability in tax liability would
deter expansion of business activities across state lines. The possibility that the
presence in a state of solicitors merely authorized to solicit orders would subject
a vendor to income tax liability was disturbing not only because of the lack of
precision with which the Supreme Court decisions defined the area of taxability
and non-taxability but also because it was feared that out-of-state vendors might
be taxed on more than one hundred per cent (100%) of income. This fear
resulted from the lack of uniformity in apportionment formulae used by states
in determining corporate net income tax liability.5' Excessive legal, accounting,
and record keeping costs of complying with widely varying statutes in more
than forty jurisdictions imposing net income tax also caused concern. These
were the major fears expressed in the congressional hearings. The case presented by out-of-state vendors at these hearings was persuasive enough to induce Congress to enact legislation which would attempt to delineate taxable
and non-taxable areas with greater precision.
Section 101 (a) (1) of the congressional act 52 prohibits states or political
sub-divisions thereof from taxing net income where the only contact the out-ofstate vendor has with the taxing jurisdiction is solicitation by said vendor,52 or
his representative, of orders for sales of tangible personal property 4 which
are sent outside the taxing jurisdiction for approval or rejection. Section 101
(a) (2) extends this immunity to vendors who solicit in a similar fashion, but in
the nameof or for the benefit of a prospective customer. Section 101 (c) extends
51 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted a Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, which has been approved by the Committee of State
Officials on Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments and the American Bar
Association. See hearing before the Select Committee on Small Business, 86th Congress, 1st Session,
at 166-169 (1959).
52 Public Law No. 272, 86th Congress (September 14, 1959).
5a In general, it would appear to be commercially unrealistic for vendors, who personally solicit
orders in the taxing jurisdiction, to postpone formal acceptance of the orders until they are outside
the taxing jurisdiction. But the act as presently enacted envisages and grants immunity to vendors
in this type of situation. P.L. No. 272, 86th Congress, § 101 (a) (1) & (2), enacted September 14,
1959.
54 Many problems are left unanswered by this statute. For example, a vendor selling services
would not be entitled to immunity under this act. In addition, it is probable that much litigation
will develop to determine whether mixed sales and service transactions should be properly classified
as sales or service transactions.
In particular, it should be noted that the motor carrier in ET & WNC Transportation Co.
v. Currie, supra, note 49, (one of the cases which precipitated the concern which led to the enactment of the federal statute), would not be entitled to immunity from state or local tax under this
statute, since solicitation of freight or passenger business does not constitute a sale of tangible
personal property.
Litigation is also likely to result from the fact that the act does not define the term "tangible
personal property."
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similar immunity to vendors who solicit sales through one or more "independent
contractors," irrespective of whether the orders are accepted in the taxing state
and whether or not the "independent contractor" has an office in the taxing state.
Section 101 (d) (1) of the act provides:
the term "independent contractor" means a commission agent, broker, or other
independent contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the
sale of, tangible personal property for more than one principal and who holds

himself out as such in the regular course of his business activities; . . .
The "independent contractor" provisions of Sections 101 (c) and (d) of the
act extend the immunity from tax beyond the mere solicitationby travelingsalesman area of relief which was requested by out-of-state vendors after the Northwestern-Stockham and related decisions. In addition, much confusion is injected
into the statute as a result of the above quoted definition of "independent contractor." " One could infer from the context in which the term "independent
contractor" is used in Section 101 (c) of the act that this section of the statute
intends to immunize out-of-state vendors from net income tax liability in situations where the person with whom the vendor deals in the taxing state in no way
represents the vendor in transactions with third persons and has no power to
create tort or contract obligations on the vendor's behalf. This, however, is negated by the inclusion of "commission agent" and "broker" within the definition
of "independent contractor." Is it reasonable to grant 'immunity from state net
income tax to a vendor operating in a taxing jurisdiction through a "commission
agent" or any other type of agent who maintains an office and enters into binding
contracts with-in the taxing jurisdiction on 'behalf of his principal? Was such a
broad grant of immunity requested of Congress by out-of-state vendors following
the decisions in the Northwestern-Stockham related cases? Did Congress intend
to grant such broad immunity to out-of-state vendors 'from state net income tax
liability? The report of the House members of the Conference Committee,
which considered the bill prior to its enactment, expressly states:
Both the House and Senate bills contain a minimum activities approach
to the problem of State taxation of income from interstate commerce. It was
the purpose of both Houses to specifically exempt, from State taxation, income

derived from interstate commerce where the only business activity within the
State by the out-of-State company was solicitation. 56

However, under the statute as enacted, the out-of-state vendor can acquire
immunity from state or local income tax merely by reimbursing his agent through
commissions rather than wages or salary and by engaging the services of an agent
55Apart from any statutory definition of the term "independent contractor" confusion exists
in the cases and among the authorities on the meaning of this term: See RESTATEMENT (2nd) AGENCY
§ 1, 2, 14 (n) (1958) and MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 12-15 (4th Ed. 1952).
56 H. Rep. No. 1103, 86th Cong., 1st Session, p. 4 (1959).
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who sells or solicits for more than one principal. It should be noted that the
agent under these circumstances can maintain an office and enter into binding
contracts in the taxing jurisdiction without subjecting his principal to tax liability.
For example, where P, a principal incorporated in state X, employes such
an agent, A, to solicit orders and enter into binding contracts on his behalf for the
sale of lumber in state Y, P is immune from Y's net income tax if A also sells
shoe laces for another principal and "holds himself out" as willing to sell or solicit tangible personal property for more than one principal "in the regular
course of his business activities." Under these circumstances P is immune despite the fact that A maintains an office in Y from which he distributes P's merchandise and literature and services P's account.
There can be no question that in the above stated shoe lace-lunber hypothetical, the out-of-state vendor is operating in the taxing state through a
... commission agent . . .who is engaged in selling or soliciting orders for
the sale of tangible personal property for more than one principal and who holds
himself out as such in the regular course of his activities" and that said vendor
is therefore immune from Y's net income tax. This result in substance enables
the out-of-state vendor to obtain all of the benefits of legal, police and other
services provided by the state and also to gain the competitive advantages derived
from local acceptance of contracts, local servicing of accounts, local distribution
of advertising literature, etc., on the same basis as local merchants. Yet, he incurs
none of the income tax liability which the local merchants incur.
Is hasty enactment of such legislation without careful consideration of its
full implications the answer to the failure of the states to adopt a uniform allocation formula to be used in determining the amount of net income tax liability
incurred by vendors operating in more than one state? Is such precipitate action
an answer to the need for clear standards which will enable vendors operating
across state lines to predict the circumstances under which solicitation by traveling salesmen will subject them to net income tax liability? The act suggests that
Congress itself was not fully convinced of the propriety and desirability of its
action. " ' Section 201 of the act authorizes and requires the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the
United States Senate, or any duly authorized subcommittees thereof, to make full
and complete studies of the entire subject of state taxation of income derived
from intrastate business activities which are related to interstate commerce.
These studies are for the purpose of recommending to Congress proposed legislation providing uniform standards to be observed by the states in imposing
57 Senate Finance Committee Report, 20 CCH STATE TAx REv. No. 33, pp. 7-19. See in particu.
lar the minority report.
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income taxes on income so derived. Section 202 of the act provides that the
committees shall report to their respective Houses the results of such studies
together with proposals for legislation on or before July 1, 1962.
The federal constitution delegates to Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. "8 Of course, the right of state governments to legislate where
the federal government has not enacted legislation intended exclusively to
pre-empt the field covered by delegated powers has long been established."' At
the date of writing, it is premature to predict what constitutional hurdles may be
placed in the path of the above mentioned federal legislation. However, a few
preliminary observations are in order at this time.
Some limits in the federal government's power to prevent states from taxing
income derived from events occurring in interstate commerce would appear to
exist. Congress, through use of its power to regulate interstate commerce, has
legislated extensively in areas ranging from the activities of the Interstate Commerce Commission to the vast field of labor relations. The revenue of the
states would indeed be seriously affected if Congress were to deny the states
the right to tax income derived from all activities occurring within any area
which has been labeled "interstate commerce." Such legislation would make
a mockery of a state's right to exercise the reserved powers granted to it by the
10th Amendment. It is clear that state programs in the field of education, highways, health, etc., would be jeopardized. Of course, no such blanket curtailment
of a state's taxing power is intended by the present legislation. However,
serious questions are clearly raised by a federal statute which not only prevents
states from imposing net income tax where the vendor is operating in a state
through mere solicitation by traveling salesmen but also prevents states from
imposing tax where the vendor operates in the taxing state through a "commission agent" or any other type of agent who maintains an office and solicits orders
and enters into binding contracts on behalf of his principal within the taxing
state. States probably would also contest the constitutionality of a federal statute which prevented them from taxing net income only where the vendor's contact with the taxing jurisdiction is limited to mere solicitation by traveling
salesmen.
The cases previously discussed in this article analyze the factors the Supreme
Court has considered relevant in establishing the circumstances under which
local activities related to interstate commerce will 'be considered sufficiently removed from interstate commerce and sufficiently related to the taxing state so
that state taxation of income derived from such activities will not be deemed to
58 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, d. 3.
59 Cooley v. Philadelphia Ct. Wardens, 53 U.S. (Howard) 298 (1851).
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place an undue burden on interstate commerce. Will not and should not the converse side of this issue be raised? Namely, under what circumstances is Congressional curtailment of the states' right to tax income derived from local activities related to interstate commerce an undue restriction of the states' taxing
power because the curtailment applies to taxation of activities which are intimately connected with the taxing state and only remotely related to interstate
commerce?
Examination of the sales, use, and net income tax cases discussed herein
indicates that the United States Supreme Court, when weighing the local interests of the states in obtaining revenue necessary to exercise the reserved powers
given to them by the 10th amendment against the national interest of the federal
government in protecting interstate commerce against discriminatory or burdensome legislation,6 ° has generally not considered private sales law rules controlling in deciding questions of tax liability involving out-of-state vendors. If
the Court has found a sufficient "nexus" with the taxing jurisdiction and absence
of discrimination against interstate commerce, it has generally sustained the
taxes, irrespective of place of acceptance, delivery, or passage of title. The
Court has thereby indicated that it is not inclined to resolve questions of tax liability of out-of-state vendors by applying technical sales law rules whose primary
function is to provide standards for resolving disputes between private litigants.
As previously noted in the Miller case, the Supreme Court ruled that the
interstate commerce clause prevented Maryland from requiring a Delaware vendor to act as its agent for collection of use tax from Maryland purchasers on the
ground that the "nexus" between the activities of the Delaware vendor and
Maryland was insufficient. The Court distinguished the General Trading case
and reaffirmed the imposition of the tax therein in the following terms:
That was the case [referring to the General Trading case] of an out-ofstate merchant entering the taxing state through traveling sales agents to conduct continuous local solicitation followed by delivery of ordered goods to the

customers, the only nonlocal phase of the total sale being acceptance of the
order. Probably, except for credit reasons, acceptance was a mere formality,
since one hardly incurs the cost of soliciting orders to reject. The Court could
properly approve the State's decision to regard such a rivalry with its local
merchants as equivalent to being a local merchant. (Emphasis added.) 6
In Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) Justice Frankfurter stated:
"The power of the States to tax and the limitations upon that power imposed by the commerce clause have necessitated a long, continuous process of judicial adjustment. The need
for such adjustment is inherent in a Federal Government like ours, where the same transaction
60

has aspects that may concern the interests and involve the authority of both the Central Govern-

ment and the constituent States. . . . Suffice it to say that especially in this field opinions must
be read in the setting of the particular cases and as the product of preoccupation with their
special facts."
For general reference see cases cited in LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, THE CONSnTUTION OF U.S. OF AMERICA, pp. 721-724 (1952).
61

Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 535, 540 (1954).
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Does this not indicate that the Court considers the extent to which a vendor
has chosen to compete in and invade the local market a more pertinent inquiry
than that of determining whether a vendor or his representative has merely
solicited and not accepted orders in the taxing state? Is not a substantial invasion of the local market established by continuous and systematic use of advertising and solicitors (irrespective of their power to formally enter into binding contracts) and sales volumes which often amount to several million dollars
a year? Justice Clark's observation in the Northwestern-Stockham case is particularly pertinent:
The record is without conflict that both corporations engage in substantial
income-producing activity in the taxing States. In fact . . . almost half of the
corporation's income is derived from the taxing State's sales which are shown
to be promoted by vigorous and continuous sales campaigns run through a
central office located in the State.62 (Emphasis added.)

Congress and state legislatures, in evaluating the merits of legislation in
this area, and the Supreme Court, in passing on the constitutionality of such
legislation, must recognize the need of out-of-state vendors for standards with

which to predict tax liability and their need for protection against unreasonable
compliance costs and imposition of tax on more than 100% of income. Against
these needs Congress, state legislatures and the court must balance the desirability
of requiring out-of-state vendors to pay a fair share of the costs of legal, police,
and other services provided by a state. In the Northwestern-Stockham case, Justice Clark stated:
While it is true that a state may not erect a wall around its borders preventing commerce an entry, it is axiomatic that the founders did not intend to
immunize such commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of the state
63
government in return for the benefits it derives from within the state. ..

The need to protect local business against the possibility of being placed at a
competitive disadvantage in the local market as a result of the fact that it must
pay the tax which the out-of-state vendor is able to avoid must also be considered.

As for the legal position of local businessmen who are required to pay net
income taxes imposed by states, serious questions of due process and equality
of treatment are raised by a federal statute which has the effect of exempting
only out-of-state vendors from tax liability.
62
63.-
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79 S. Ct. 357, 366 (1959).
, 79 S.Ct. 357, 364 (1959).
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ENFORCEMENT AND COLLECrION

The Pennoyerv. Neff"' due process limitations relating to service of process
on out-of-state residents and corporations have been substantially whittled away
since that decision was rendered in 1877.65
In 1945 the Supreme Court 'held in the case of InternationalShoe Co. v. State
of Washington" that the presence of traveling salesmen in Washington whose
authority was limited to mere solicitation of orders constituted a sufficient
"nexus" with said state to sustain the Washington court's jurisdiction in a suit by
Washington against the out-of-state corporation to recover unemployment compensation tax. The Washington statute allowed the state to issue an order and
notice of assessment for delinquent contributions upon personal service of the
notice to the employer, if found within the state, or, if not so found, by mailing
the notice to the employer by registered mail at his last known address.6" The
notice of assessment was personally served upon a sales solicitor employed by
the corporation in the state of Washington and a copy of the notice was mailed
by registered mail to the corporation at its address in Missouri. The corporation made a special appearance before the office of unemployment and moved to
set aside the order and notice of assessment on the ground that the service was
improper, that it was not a corporation of the state of Washington and was not
doing business there, and that it had no agent within the state upon whom service could be made. In holding that the foreign corporation was subject to service
of process the Supreme Court stated:
.. the activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State of
Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout the years in question. They resulted in a large volume of
interstate business, in the course of which appellant received the benefits and
64

95 U.S. 714 (1877).

See "Development of the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff as regards jurisdiction over non-resident
individuals and foreign corporations-Supreme Court cases," 2 L. Ed. 2d 1644.
85

66 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
67 Pa. H. R. Bill No. 2100, which was passed by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on

August 25, 1959, and the Pennsylvania Senate on September 22, 1959, (at this date House concurrence is required) in amending section 548.3 of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act, provides
as follows:
"Any person maintaining a place of business within this Commonwealth is deemed to have
appointed the Secretary of the Commonwealth his agent for the acceptance of service of process
or notice in any proceedings for the enforcement of the civil provisions of this act, and any
service made upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth as such agent shall be of the same legal
force and validity as if such service had been personally made upon such person. Where service
cannot be made upon such person in the manner provided by other laws of this Commonwealth
relating to service of process, service may be made upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
and in such case a copy of the process or notice shall also be personally served upon any agent
or representative of such person who may be found within this Commonwealth, or where no
such agent or representative may be found a copy of the process or notice shall forthwith be
sent by registered mail to such person at the last known address of his principal place of
business, home office or residence."
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protection of the laws of the state, including the right to resort to the courts for
the enforcement of its rights. The obligation which is here sued upon arose out
of those very activities. It is evident that these operations established sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to our traditional concept of fair play and substantial justice to permit
the state to enforce the obligation which appellant had incurred there. 8
In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co., 9 the out-of-state corporation,
a Texas insurance company, was sued by a California beneficiary who recovered
a default judgment in California on a contract of insurance. The out-of-state
corporation was not served in California and the jurisdiction of the California
court was based on a California statute subjecting foreign corporations to suit in
California on insurance contracts with residents of the state, even though such
corporation could not be served with process within its borders. In sustaining
the right of the beneficiary to sue the out-of-state corporation in the California
courts, the Court deemed it sufficient for purposes of the due process clause that
the beneficiary's suit was based on a contract which had a substantial connection
with California. The Court noted that the insurance contract between the insurance company and the insured was delivered in California, the premiums were
mailed from California, and the insured was a resident of California when he
died. It also noted that California residents would be at a severe disadvantage if
they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant state in order to
hold it legally accountable, and that in cases of small claims, claimants of moderate means frequently would not be able to afford the cost of 'bringing an action
in a foreign forum. In effect, this would make the company judgment proof.
The Court also noted that crucial witnesses would more likely be -found in the
insured's locality. It concluded, "Of course, there may be an inconvenience to
the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract
but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process." 10
In its decision the Court also said,
In a continuing process df evolution this Court accepted and then abandoned "consent," "doing business," and "presence" as the standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over such corporations. . . . More recently in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, . . . the Court decided that

"due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. "326 U.S. 316.
68 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
69 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
70

Id. at 224.
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Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernable toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other non-residents.71
These decisions supply potent authority for states to acquire jurisdiction for
service of process on out-of-state vendors liable for sales, use or net income tax
as a result of their operation in the taxing state through solicitors.
However, many states have taken additional legislative measures to improve
enforcement and collection efforts in this area. Twenty-five states have enacted
reciprocal enforcement legislation granting other states the right to bring suit
in their courts to recover unpaid taxes if the sister state grants similar reciprocal
rights.7 2 Illinois has entertained suits to collect out-of-state taxes without having
any comity laws on the statute books. The effectiveness of this type of legislative or judicial comity is illustrated by the case of Oklahoma v. H. D. Lee Co.,
Inc. 73 In that case Oklahoma authorities brought suit against a wholesale dealer
in the Kansas Courts for unpaid taxes due on the dealer's sale of supplies to a
Tulsa purchaser. The dealer had no office in Oklahoma and was making deliveries from warehouses in Kansas and Missouri. He may have felt that the Oklahoma authorities had no effective recourse against him. However, the authorities
successfully brought suit in the Kansas Court and imposed liability for the unpaid
tax and 10 per cent penalty.
In addition to requiring registration and filing of returns by out-of-state
vendors operating through solicitors, a South Carolina statute requires registration and collection of use tax by every retailer who ".

.

. distributes catalogs or

other advertising matter and by reason thereof receives and accepts orders from
residents within the State." 11 Comparable legislation is being actively promoted
in the present session of the Pennsylvania Legislature by the Pennsylvania Retailer's Association.75 This is understandable in light of the fact that local
vendors are placed at a competitive disadvantage if they must require payment of
tax on sales while out-of-state vendors are able to sell the same type of merchandise to the same purchasers free of tax.
71 1d. at 222.

ALL STATE SALES TAX REP. 11 1-156. Pa. H. R. Bill No. 2100, § 548.2 provides:
"The courts of this Commonwealth shall recognize and enforce liabilities for SALES AND
USE taxes 'lawfully imposed by any other state provided that such other state extends a like
comity to this Commonwealth."
7a 174 Kan. 114, 254 P. 2d 291 (1953).
74 S. C.Code §§ 65-1424, 65-1429; 3 CCH ALL STATE SALES TAX REP. ff
67-150, 67-155.
75 Pa. H. R. Bill No.2100, § 3:
"Regularly or substantially soliciting orders within this Commonwealth in connection with
the lease, sale or delivery of tangible personal property to or the performance thereon of services
for residents of this Commonwealth by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether such
orders are accepted within or without this Commonwealth."
72 1

CCH
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Action against representatives of the out-of-state vendor may provide another method for obtaining compliance of the out-of-state vendor. Regulations
issued under the Pennsylvania Selective Sales and Use Tax Act require every person operating a club or similar merchandising plan and every agent, salesman,
representative, peddler, canvasser or other person soliciting orders within the
Commonwealth for tangible personal property to be delivered or used within the
Commonwealth to register and obtain a license unless the person supplying the
merchandise has registered and 'been granted a license. However, the agent,
salesman, etc., remains liable for any tax which his supplier has failed to properly remit to the Department.76 Another ruling issued under the Pennsylvania
Selective Sales and Use Tax Act requires solicitors, salesmen, agents and other
representatives who solicit or take orders of tangible personal property in Pennsylvania on behalf of out-of-state vendors or lessors to file with the Bureau of
Sales and Use Tax . . . a report of vendors on whose behalf he has taken
orders for taxable personal property to be sold or leased and delivered or shipped
to destinations within this Commonwealth. . . .""' Failure of an agent to
comply with these regulations would constitute an attempt to evade or defeat
the tax or, alternatively, the rendering of assistance to evade or defeat the tax.
Thus, it would subject the solicitor, salesman, etc., to the penalties prescribed by
the Pennsylvania Selective Sales and Use Tax Act.78
76 CCH PA. SALES TAX REP.
,7 CCH PA. SALES TAX REP.
78

f 64-234, 60-606.
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